That part of the Civil
Liberties Act of 1988,titled "Public Education", the curriculum
and resource guide ( to teaching our school children) is the 'oft repeated
litany referring to the CWRIC "findings" . Such utterances as :
"the U.S. government's own study commission found the reason for the
Japanese exclusion was "race prejudice, war hysteria and a failure of
political leadership." It fails to inform us that the Japanese themselves
did approve of those who became members of that Commission (CWRIC), thru their
Japanese-American Citizen's League (JACL) and NCRR.
This was their Commission; pre approved and pre ordained.
At the hearings of the CWRIC Commission, pro government witnesses were badgered,
ridiculed and harassed by both the Commission members and the largely Japanese
audience. (from "Intelligence, Internment and Relocation" byKeith
Robar -Kikar Publications p.167)
Let us view the words of some of those with great expertise on this subject:
Henry Kane, late Attn'y General of state of Oregon: " the Commission
ignored numerous facts known to FDR (President Roosevelt); an espionage ring
operating out of the Japanese consulate in Los Angeles; intercepted 'MAGIC'
(deciphered Jap codes); messages reflecting espionage activity by Japanese
born residents and Japanese-Americans prior to Pearl Harbor; that virtually
the entire adult Japanese community in the U.S. financially and otherwise
supported the Japanese invasion of China; that on Dec 7,1941, a Japanese-American
aided a downed Jap pilot that had just bombed Pearl Harbor; that thousands
of adult internee's actively supported fascist Japan, threatened and injured
pro-America Japanese-Americans; and that thousands renounced their U.S. citizenship."
……………….
"Almost all the testimony by Japanese-Americans before this Commission
has been decidedly pro-redress because the moderate voices have been largely
squelched. The report of the CWRIC "Personal Justice Denied" is
very biased". Mas Odoi, President 442nd Memorial Assn, Seattle, WA
……………….
" During my testimony and personal experience at the hearings of the
Commission, I believe its conduct was a horrendous affront to our traditions
for fair and objective hearings. Whenever I sought in the slightest degree
to justify the action of the United States which was ordered by President
Roosevelt, my testimony was met with hisses and boos such as I had never before
heard, over an experience extending back to World War I, been heretofore subjected
to………..the Commission was not at all disposed to conduct an
objective investigation." John J> McCloy, Ass't Secretary of War under
FDR
………………..
" The summary of the CWRIC "Personal Justice Denied" is one-sided,
faultfinding propaganda. From the beginning the Commission members were carefully
selected by the JACL, so it is not impartial. The Commission chair, Joan Bernstein,
herself disqualified by expressing pro-redress comments before the public
hearings began. First of all, Executive Order 9066 was the remedy, not the
cause of our wartime ordeal." Shonin Yamashita, Issei. From his book-It
Had To Be So.
………………..
In reviewing the Commission's report and recommendations, one encounters three
leading characteristics: intellectual dishonesty, moral posturing, and political
opportunism." Dr. Ken Masugi, Resident Fellow
Claremont Inst.
…………………
" The report Personal Justice Denied strikes me as essentially in the
form of a legal brief rather than a history. Historical information in this
brief serves a specific purpose--------to present the case against the government
in the most favorable light. Such an approach means that factual information
is selected to serve the interest of the client. It means also that the facts
are ordered and interpreted so as to provide the best support for the client.
All is calculated to support the conclusion that the government denied personal
justice to those interned during World War II. Facts and arguments that might
tend to support a contrary conclusion are either excluded or rejected."
Dr David Trask, Chief Army Historian.
…………………
The Commission report Personal Justice Denied, upon which the Civil Right
Act of 1988 is based, was the product of a biased group of individuals' dogmatic
refusal to account for and investigate documents and testimony INCONSISTANT
with their forgone conclusions. Witnesses sympathetic to the Commission's
position. Not under oath, submitted testimony that had previousely been coached."
John P. Coale of the law firm of Coale, Allen and Susteren.
………………….
" ………That report, CWRIC Personal Justice Denied, is not
complete, it is not accurate, it is biased blast against bias and a prejudiced
polemic against prejudice, and it economizes in the use of truth." Frederick
Bernays Wiener, Col. USA Ret. Retired lawyer
…………………..
Does any of the above appear in the JACL National 'Education' Committee's
" A Lesson in American History"? Absolutely NOT! Only that which
is approved by the JACL is taught to our school children.
All the above (CWRIC
page) quotations are derived from the (totally documented) book "Intelligence,
Internment & Relocation" by Keith Robar
(which incidentally is NOT among those books on the 'approved' book list of
the JACL National 'Education' Committee). Published by Kikar Publications,
Seattle WA-with permission. www.kikarpublications.com
In 1975, the Japanese American Citizens
League (JACL) launched a campaign for reparations for those Japanese who had
been forced to evacuate the West Coast during World War II. A heavily financed
lobbying effort came to fruition five years later when the House of Representatives
passed a bill creating the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment
of Civilians. The commission's primary mission was to review "the facts
and circumstances surrounding Executive Order Numbered 9066, issued February
19, 1942, and the impact of such Executive Order on American citizens and
permanent resident aliens." The commission was also directed to "recommend
appropriate remedies."
That the commission was to recommend "remedies" indicates that government
guilt had already been assumed:
The commission needed only to gather evidence to support that conclusion and
determine the nature of reparations. Nearly all nine commissioners-three appointed
by President Carter and six by Congress-had long histories of leftist activism.
Joan Z. Bernstein, who would chair the commission, had already declared the
evacuation "a blot on the history of the U.S." Former Supreme Court
justice and National Lawyers Guild member Arthur J. Goldberg had called it
"a horrendous thing." Hugh B. Mitchell, a representative from Washington
state, termed it "a great wrong." Former Massachusetts congressman
Robert F. Drinan, S.J., had not only made similar pronouncements but had asked,
referring to the evacuees, "How much are we going to give them?"
Also appointed were
Arthur S. Flemming, a member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission until fired
by President Reagan; former senator Edward W. Brooke of Massachusetts, the
first of only two blacks to serve in the Senate since Reconstruction; William
M. Marutani, a Nisei evacuee who was the JACL's legal counsel; Ishmael V.
Cromoff a Russian Orthodox priest evacuated from the Aleutian Islands when
the Japanese invaded; and Daniel E. Lungren, a freshman representative who
had conservative credentials but also a significant number of Japanese-Americans
in his district.
The commission was given three-dozen staff members; more than a third were
Japanese-Americans. Many of the others had been active in the campaign to
secure reparations. The staff included no World War II military historians,
intelligence officers, or government officials. Witnesses were not put under
oath, and those opposed to reparations were interrupted or drowned out by
jeering spectators.
John J. McCloy, the
assistant secretary of war who monitored the evacuation and relocation in
1942, said that "it became clear from the outset of my testimony that
the Commission was not at all disposed to conduct an objective investigation."
The officer in charge of the evacuation, Karl R. Bendesten, simply stopped
in the middle of his testimony, saying "I knew it would be fruitless.
Every commissioner had made up his mind before he was appointed." Retired
Brig. Gen. A.W. Beeman said, "I tried to give testimony before the Commission
in Seattle. However, I was drummed out by a lecture on 'racism' delivered
by Dr. Arthur S. Flemming."
Even more disturbing
was the Orwellian omission of former senator SI. Hayakawa's testimony from
the commission's final report. Contending with boos and jeers, Hayakawa testified
against reparations, strongly and eloquently, but none of it can be found
in the final report, a 500-page polemic entitled Personal Justice Denied.
The commission apparently was also ignorant of the most critical information
concerning the decision to evacuate the Japanese: In the original edition
of Personal Justice Denied, there is no mention of MAGIC, the decryptions
of intercepted Japanese transmissions, which reveal widespread espionage by
resident Japanese aliens and Japanese Americans along the West Coast
Soon after Personal
Justice Denied was published, David D. Lowman, a career intelligence officer
with the National Security Agency, wrote an article in the New York Times
questioning the absence of MAGIC. When reporters asked Bernstein why MAGIC
was ignored, she replied, evidently chagrined, that the commissioners had
never heard of it Attempting to avoid further embarrassment the commission
quickly released, with no expert input, a five-page error-filled addendum
claiming, incredibly, that a "review of the 'Magic' cables does not alter
the Commission's position." Dan Lungren, a cautious conservative who
had done little until this point to thwart the commission's agenda, added
his own footnote:
For us as a Commission
to deny that the decoded Japanese cables compiled in the MAGIC volumes did
not influence the decision made by America's leaders, tends to undercut the
credibility of our historical pursuit.
David F. Trask, chief
historian at the U.S. Army Center of Military History, said that the report
was:
in the form of a legal brief rather than a history. . . . All is calculated
to support the conclusion that the government denied personal justice to those
interned during World War II. Facts and arguments that might tend to support
a contrary conclusion are either excluded or rejected.
Nonetheless, Congress, not without dissent, accepted the conclusion of the
commission-that EO 9066 was based not on military considerations but on "race
prejudice, war hysteria, and a failure of political leadership" and later
passed the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, giving each of those relocated
or interned $20,000- totaling more than a billion dollars. Congress also allocated
millions for teaching the history of the evacuation according to Personal
Justice Denied. School textbooks now / include excerpts from the report and
omit any reference to MAGIC.
Used BY Permission From Roger D. McGrath
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